The operational mechanism and effectiveness of China's central environmental protection inspection: Evidence from air pollution. (June 2022)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Kou, Po; Han, Ying; Qi, Xiaoyuan
• Is Part Of: Socio-economic planning sciences. Number 81(2022)
• Publication Date: 2022-06
• Subjects: Central environmental protection inspection -- Differential game -- Key cities of environmental protection -- Multi-governance model; Planning -- Periodicals; Economic policy -- Periodicals; Social policy -- Periodicals; Planification -- Périodiques; Politique économique -- Périodiques; Politique sociale -- Périodiques; ECONOMIC PLANNING; SOCIAL PLANNING; DECISION-MAKING; 361
• DOI: 10.1016/j.seps.2021.101215
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0038-0121

Abstract

Abstract: As a practice of campaign-style pollution control, the central environmental inspection has great guiding significance for China's environmental management system reform. This paper analyzes the operational mechanism of central environmental protection inspection from the perspective of multi-governance and tests its effectiveness from both theory and empirical evidence. We find that the central environmental protection inspection can improve environmental quality. However, the air quality improvement of non-key cities of environmental protection is better than that of key cities of environmental protection. Besides, the effectiveness of the central environmental protection inspection is unsustainable. The results show that the direct intervention of the power of the Party Central Committee and the central government is a significant driving force to realize the improvement of the environmental quality by playing the role of the multi-governance model in the environment. The continuous environmental participation of the Party Central Committee and the central government is the guarantee for achieving the continuous operation of the multi-government model and maintaining the effect of environmental quality improvement. Highlights: We analyze the operating mechanism of the CEPI from the perspective of multi-governance. A differential game is constructed to explain why the CEPI can reduce pollution. The CEPI can improve air quality, but its effectiveness is unsustainable. The air quality improvement of non-key cities is better than that of key cities.