Managerial Myopia in Mismanaging Renewable Resources: The GONE FISHING Game. (December 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Barnabè, Federico
• Other Names: Yilmaz Levent guest-editor.; Ören Tuncer guest-editor.
• Is Part Of: Simulation & gaming. Volume 46:Number 6(2015:Dec.)
• Page Start: 763
• Page End: 791
• Publication Date: 2015-12
• Subjects: group dynamics -- managerial myopia -- mental models -- misperception of dynamics -- overexploitation of renewable resources -- personal heuristics -- renewable resources management -- simulation -- simulation experiments -- System Dynamics Interactive Learning Environments -- tragedy of the commons; Social sciences -- Study and teaching -- Periodicals; Simulation methods -- Periodicals; Game theory -- Periodicals; Sciences sociales -- Étude et enseignement -- Périodiques; Simulation, Méthodes de -- Périodiques; Jeu de rôle -- Périodiques; Éducation; Jeu d'entreprise; Jeu de simulation; Méthode de simulation; Sciences sociales; Théorie des jeux; Périodique électronique (Descripteur de forme); Ressource Internet (Descripteur de forme); 003.3
• DOI: 10.1177/1046878115615991
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1046-8781

Abstract

Background . Previous research demonstrates three maincauses for frequent cases ofoverexploitation ofrenewable resources : open access, provision problem and misperception of dynamics. Aim . The aim of this study is to explore the role of afourth factor foroverexploitation ofrenewable resources, managerial myopia (also referred to as short-termism ), as well as to further explore the role ofmental models, personal heuristics andgroup dynamics inmismanagement of renewable resources . Method . For this purpose, the study adopts an experimental design using aSystem Dynamics (SD)-basedInteractive Learning Environment (ILE). The SD-ILE offers sufficient information to the players who are instructed to operate in anoligopoly situation where open access is excluded. Findings .Managerial myopia seems to be a relevant factor in pushing players to developshort-term, over-aggressive policies. The simulations show thatoptimal or sufficient policies arerejected by players, even when correctly identified, due to perverse incentives generated by short-term accounting goals. A feasible solution for myopic behavior is identified and tested: measuring a larger, balanced set ofperformance indicators on which managers develop their strategies. Conclusions . The experiment shows that significantimprovements in performance and mitigation of myopic behavior are possible. It also demonstrates the relevant role that SD-ILEs may play in studyingrenewable resource issues and assistingdecision-makers in developing and implementing coherentpolicies .