Rents from power for a dissident elite and mass mobilization. (6th December 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Aköz, Kemal Kivanç; Hernández‐Lagos, Pablo
• Is Part Of: Scottish journal of political economy. Volume 66:Number 4(2019)
• Page Start: 584
• Page End: 604
• Publication Date: 2018-12-06
• Subjects: Great Britain -- Economic conditions -- 1945-1964 -- Periodicals; Great Britain -- Economic conditions -- 1964-1979 -- Periodicals; Great Britain -- Economic conditions -- 1979-1997 -- Periodicals; 330.9411005
• DOI: 10.1111/sjpe.12205
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0036-9292

Abstract

Abstract: Popular uprisings in autocracies seldom lead to democratic regimes. We propose a model that helps explain how rents from power encourage popular revolts. We study why citizens would follow a dissident group seeking regime change, if rents from change accrue only to the group. Our model predicts that higher rents may increase the incidence of public mobilization because rents facilitate coordination. The results suggest that cohesive dissident groups may spur seemingly spontaneous mass mobilizations, even when the mass public know that the dissident group is driven by greed rather than a genuine desire to halt incumbent's rent‐seeking activities.