Is There A Monist Theory of Causal and Noncausal Explanations? The Counterfactual Theory of Scientific Explanation. Issue 5 (December 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Reutlinger, Alexander
• Is Part Of: Philosophy of science. Volume 83:Issue 5(2016)
• Page Start: 733
• Page End: 745
• Publication Date: 2016-12
• Subjects: Science -- Periodicals; Science -- Philosophy; Science; Science -- Philosophy; Philosophie des sciences; Epistemology; Periodicals; 501
• DOI: 10.1086/687859
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1539-767X

Abstract

Abstract : The goal of this paper is to develop a counterfactual theory of explanation (CTE). The CTE provides a monist framework for causal and noncausal explanations, according to which both causal and noncausal explanations are explanatory by virtue of revealing counterfactual dependencies between the explanandum and the explanans. I argue that the CTE is applicable to two paradigmatic examples of noncausal explanations: Euler's explanation and renormalization group explanations of universality.