Explaining (One Aspect of) the Principal Principle without (Much) Metaphysics. Issue 4 (October 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Elliott, Katrina
• Is Part Of: Philosophy of science. Volume 83:Issue 4(2016)
• Page Start: 480
• Page End: 499
• Publication Date: 2016-10
• Subjects: Science -- Periodicals; Science -- Philosophy; Science; Science -- Philosophy; Philosophie des sciences; Epistemology; Periodicals; 501
• DOI: 10.1086/687258
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1539-767X

Abstract

Abstract : According to David Lewis's Principal Principle, our beliefs about the objective chances of outcomes (typically) determine our rational credences in those outcomes. Lewis influentially argues that any adequate metaphysics of objective chance must explain why the Principal Principle holds. Since no theory of chance is widely agreed to have met this burden, I suggest we change tack. On the view I develop, a central aspect of the Principal Principle holds not because of what objective chances are but rather because of the explanatory role that objective chances play for the rational agents who believe in them.