The Risk of Using Inductive Risk to Challenge the Value-Free Ideal. Issue 4 (October 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: de Melo-Martín, Inmaculada; Intemann, Kristen
• Is Part Of: Philosophy of science. Volume 83:Issue 4(2016)
• Page Start: 500
• Page End: 520
• Publication Date: 2016-10
• Subjects: Science -- Periodicals; Science -- Philosophy; Science; Science -- Philosophy; Philosophie des sciences; Epistemology; Periodicals; 501
• DOI: 10.1086/687259
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1539-767X

Abstract

Abstract : The argument from inductive risk has been embraced by many as a successful account of the role of values in science that challenges the value-free ideal. We argue that it is not obvious that the argument from inductive risk actually undermines the value-free ideal. This is because the inductive risk argument endorses an assumption held by proponents of the value-free ideal: that contextual values never play an appropriate role in determining evidence. We show that challenging the value-free ideal ultimately requires rejecting this assumption.