When Is Scientific Dissent Epistemically Inappropriate?. Issue 5 (December 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Miller, Boaz
• Is Part Of: Philosophy of science. Volume 88:Issue 5(2021)
• Page Start: 918
• Page End: 928
• Publication Date: 2021-12
• Subjects: Science -- Periodicals; Science -- Philosophy; Science; Science -- Philosophy; Philosophie des sciences; Epistemology; Periodicals; 501
• DOI: 10.1086/714854
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1539-767X

Abstract

Abstract : Normatively inappropriate scientific dissent prevents warranted closure of scientific controversies and confuses the public about the state of policy-relevant science, such as anthropogenic climate change. Against recent criticism by de Melo-Martín and Intemann of the viability of any conception of normatively inappropriate dissent, I identify three conditions for normatively inappropriate dissent: its generation process is politically illegitimate, it imposes an unjust distribution of inductive risks, and it adopts evidential thresholds outside an accepted range. I supplement these conditions with an inference-to-the-best-explanation account of knowledge-based consensus and dissent to allow policy makers to reliably identify unreliable scientific dissent.