Causal Pluralism in Philosophy: Empirical Challenges and Alternative Proposals. Issue 5 (December 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Ngoc Dinh, Phuong (Phoebe); Danks, David
• Is Part Of: Philosophy of science. Volume 88:Issue 5(2021)
• Page Start: 761
• Page End: 772
• Publication Date: 2021-12
• Subjects: Science -- Periodicals; Science -- Philosophy; Science; Science -- Philosophy; Philosophie des sciences; Epistemology; Periodicals; 501
• DOI: 10.1086/714878
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1539-767X

Abstract

Abstract : An increasing number of arguments for causal pluralism invoke empirical psychological data. Different aspects of causal cognition—specifically, causal perception and causal inference—are thought to involve distinct cognitive processes and representations, and they thereby distinctively support transference and dependency theories of causation, respectively. We argue that this dualistic picture of causal concepts arises from methodological differences, rather than from an actual plurality of concepts. Hence, philosophical causal pluralism is not particularly supported by the empirical data. Serious engagement with cognitive science reveals that the connection between psychological concepts of causation and philosophical notions is substantially more complicated than is traditionally presumed.