What Emotions Really Are (In the Theory of Constructed Emotions). Issue 4 (October 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Pober, Jeremy
• Is Part Of: Philosophy of science. Volume 85:Issue 4(2018)
• Page Start: 640
• Page End: 659
• Publication Date: 2018-10
• Subjects: Science -- Periodicals; Science -- Philosophy; Science; Science -- Philosophy; Philosophie des sciences; Epistemology; Periodicals; 501
• DOI: 10.1086/699158
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1539-767X

Abstract

Abstract : Recently, Lisa Feldman Barrett and colleagues have introduced the Theory of Constructed Emotions (TCE), in which emotions are constituted by a process of categorizing the self as being in an emotional state. The view, however, has several counterintuitive implications: for instance, a person can have multiple distinct emotions at once. Further, the TCE concludes that emotions are constitutively social phenomena. In this article, I explicate the TCE*, which, while substantially similar to the TCE, makes several distinct claims aimed at avoiding the counterintuitive implications plaguing the TCE. Further, because of the changes that comprise the TCE*, emotions are not constitutively social phenomena.