Aid: Blame It All on "Easy Money". (June 2013)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno; Smith, Alastair
• Is Part Of: Journal of conflict resolution. Volume 57:Number 3(2013)
• Page Start: 524
• Page End: 537
• Publication Date: 2013-06
• Subjects: foreign n aid -- loans -- resource curse -- selectorate theory -- United Nations Security Council -- policy concessions; War and society -- Periodicals; Peace -- Periodicals; Arbitration (International law) -- Periodicals; 327.16
• DOI: 10.1177/0022002712464315
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0022-0027

Abstract

Temporary membership on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has pernicious effects on the political and economic development of nations, particularly in nondemocracies. The leaders of rich democratic states often trade resources for the salient policy favors that UNSC members can deliver. This provides the leaders of temporary UNSC members with access to "easy money" resources. Such resources have deleterious consequences, particularly in nondemocracies, because they provide leaders with the means to pay off their coalition of supporters without reliance on tax revenues. While foreign aid is an important form of easy money bribe, it is but one of many. Empirical tests show loans are a substitute means for bribing UNSC members.