Inertia and Reactiveness in Germany's Russia Policy: From the 2021 Federal Election to the Invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Issue 4 (1st December 2022)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Driedger, Jonas J.
• Is Part Of: German politics and society. Volume 40:Issue 4(2022)
• Page Start: 135
• Page End: 151
• Publication Date: 2022-12-01
• Subjects: arms exports -- Bundeswehr -- civilian power -- German foreign policy -- German-Russian relations -- Nord Stream 2 -- sanctions -- Ukraine -- Zeitenwende; Germany -- Civilization -- Periodicals; Germany -- Politics and government -- 1945-1990 -- Periodicals; Germany -- Politics and government -- 1990- -- Periodicals; 943.005
• DOI: 10.3167/gps.2022.400407
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1558-5441

Abstract

Abstract: Despite signs that Russia was preparing an invasion of Ukraine, the newly elected German government stayed with pre-existing approaches that involved engagement and the threat of limited sanctions. However, in February 2022, just before the invasion began, Germany blocked the Nord Stream 2 pipeline system, announced weapon deliveries to Ukraine, and massively increased defense spending. This article shows that inertia and reactiveness heavily influenced the timing, nature, and extent of this massive shift in Germany's Russia policy. German leaders continued the existing policy in part because it had been formed by still influential figures and was in line with societal views. However, at the dawn of the invasion, the failure of previous policies had become undeniable, pressure from Ukraine and nato allies peaked, and societal views finally shifted. Reacting to this untenable situation, key figures in the German elite pushed through a series of measures that nato allies and Ukraine had long demanded.