CAREER CONCERNS, BEIJING STYLE. (11th June 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Che, Jiahua; Chung, Kim‐Sau; Qiao, Xue
• Is Part Of: International economic review. Volume 62:Number 4(2021)
• Page Start: 1513
• Page End: 1535
• Publication Date: 2021-06-11
• Subjects: Economics -- Periodicals; 330.05
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12523
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0020-6598

Abstract

Abstract: The China model is increasingly viewed by developing countries as a viable alternative to democracy. China's allegedly merit‐based promotion system is lauded as a secret ingredient of the China model. However, once being promoted to the top, Chinese leaders are as unconstrained as other autocrats. If there are fundamental reasons why other autocrats cannot commit to such a promotion system, why are Chinese leaders any different? We provide a unified theory that accommodates both China and other autocracies by postulating that they coordinate on different equilibria. Both the presence and the absence of political career concerns can arise in equilibrium.