Phenomenal Experiences, First-Person Methods, and the Artificiality of Experimental Data. Issue 5 (December 2014)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Feest, Uljana
• Is Part Of: Philosophy of science. Volume 81:Issue 5(2014)
• Page Start: 927
• Page End: 939
• Publication Date: 2014-12
• Subjects: Science -- Periodicals; Science -- Philosophy; Science; Science -- Philosophy; Philosophie des sciences; Epistemology; Periodicals; 501
• DOI: 10.1086/677689
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1539-767X

Abstract

Abstract : While philosophical discussions of first-person methods often turn on the veridicality of first-person reports, I argue that more attention should be paid to the circumstances and aims of their experimental production in the science of perception. After pointing to the 'constructedness' of first-person reports, I raise questions about the criteria by which to judge whether they illuminate something about the nature of perception. I illustrate this point with a historical debate between Gestalt psychologists and atomists, both of whom used first-person methods to investigate perception, but who disagreed deeply over the epistemic value of their respective first-person data.