What Elements of Successful Scientific Theories Are the Correct Targets for "Selective" Scientific Realism?. Issue 3 (July 2014)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Peters, Dean
• Is Part Of: Philosophy of science. Volume 81:Issue 3(2014)
• Page Start: 377
• Page End: 397
• Publication Date: 2014-07
• Subjects: Science -- Periodicals; Science -- Philosophy; Science; Science -- Philosophy; Philosophie des sciences; Epistemology; Periodicals; 501
• DOI: 10.1086/676537
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1539-767X

Abstract

Abstract : Selective scientific realists disagree on which theoretical posits should be regarded as essential to the empirical success of a scientific theory. A satisfactory account of essentialness will show that the (approximate) truth of the selected posits adequately explains the success of the theory. Therefore, ( a ) the essential elements must be discernible prospectively; ( b ) there cannot be a priori criteria regarding which type of posit is essential; and ( c ) the overall success of a theory, or 'cluster' of propositions, not only individual derivations, should be explicable. Given these desiderata, I propose a "unification criterion" for identifying essential elements.