On "Minimal Model Explanations": A Reply to Batterman and Rice. Issue 2 (April 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Lange, Marc
• Is Part Of: Philosophy of science. Volume 82:Issue 2(2015)
• Page Start: 292
• Page End: 305
• Publication Date: 2015-04
• Subjects: Science -- Periodicals; Science -- Philosophy; Science; Science -- Philosophy; Philosophie des sciences; Epistemology; Periodicals; 501
• DOI: 10.1086/680488
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1539-767X

Abstract

Abstract : Batterman and Rice offer an account of "minimal model explanations" and argue against "common features accounts" of those explanations. This paper offers some objections to their proposals and arguments. It argues that their proposal cannot account for the apparent explanatory asymmetry of minimal model explanations. It argues that their account threatens ultimately to collapse into a "common features account." Finally, it argues against their motivation for thinking that an explanation appealing to "common features" would have to explain the common features' own prevalence.