A Formal Framework for Representing Mechanisms?. Issue 1 (January 2014)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Gebharter, Alexander
• Is Part Of: Philosophy of science. Volume 81:Issue 1(2014)
• Page Start: 138
• Page End: 153
• Publication Date: 2014-01
• Subjects: Science -- Periodicals; Science -- Philosophy; Science; Science -- Philosophy; Philosophie des sciences; Epistemology; Periodicals; 501
• DOI: 10.1086/674206
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1539-767X

Abstract

Abstract : In this article I tackle the question of how the hierarchical order of mechanisms can be represented within a causal graph framework. I illustrate an answer to this question proposed by Casini, Illari, Russo, and Williamson and provide an example that their formalism does not support two important features of nested mechanisms: (i) a mechanism's submechanisms are typically causally interacting with other parts of said mechanism, and (ii) intervening in some of a mechanism's parts should have some influence on the phenomena the mechanism brings about. Finally, I sketch an alternative approach taking (i) and (ii) into account.