Income Inequality and State Parties: Who Gets Represented?. (December 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Wright, Gerald C.; Rigby, Elizabeth
• Is Part Of: State politics & policy quarterly. Volume 20:Number 4(2020:Dec.)
• Page Start: 395
• Page End: 415
• Publication Date: 2020-12
• Subjects: parties -- representation -- economic inequality -- public policy -- party organizations -- parties -- and interest groups; State governments -- United States -- Periodicals; Political planning -- United States -- States -- Periodicals; Gouvernements d'États fédérés -- États-Unis -- Périodiques; Politique publique -- États-Unis -- États -- Périodiques; 320.97305
• DOI: 10.1177/1532440020912461
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1532-4400

Abstract

Abstract: Recent studies of representation at the national and state levels have provided evidence that elected officials' votes, political parties' platforms, and enacted policy choices are more responsive to the preferences of the affluent, while those with average incomes and the poor have little or no impact on the political process. Yet, this research on the dominance of the affluent has overlooked key partisan differences in the electorate. In this era of hyperpartisanship, we argue that representation occurs through the party system, and we test whether taking this reality into account changes the story of policy dominance by the rich. We combine data on public preferences and state party positions to test for income bias in parties' representation of their own co-partisans. The results show an interesting pattern in which underrepresentation of the poor is driven by Democratic parties pushing the more liberal social policy stances of rich Democrats and Republican parties reflecting the particularly conservative economic policy preferences of rich Republicans. Thus, we have ample evidence that the wealthy, more often than not, do call the shots, but that the degree to which this disproportionate party responsiveness produces less representative policies depends on the party in power and the policy dimension being considered. We conclude by linking this pattern of influence and "coincidental representation" to familiar changes which define the transformation of the New Deal party system.