Disagreement and epistemic arguments for democracy. (May 2013)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Ingham, Sean
• Is Part Of: Politics, philosophy & economics. Volume 12:Number 2(2013)
• Page Start: 136
• Page End: 155
• Publication Date: 2013-05
• Subjects: Epistemic democracy -- Condorcet's jury theorem -- deliberative democracy -- democratic theory; Social sciences and ethics -- Periodicals; Philosophy and social sciences -- Periodicals; 320.05
• DOI: 10.1177/1470594X12460642
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1470-594X

Abstract

Recent accounts of epistemic democracy aim to show that in some qualified sense, democratic institutions have a tendency to produce reasonable outcomes. Epistemic democrats aim to offer such accounts without presupposing any narrow, controversial view of what the outcomes of democratic procedures should be, much as a good justification of a particular scientific research design does not presuppose the hypothesis that the research aims to test. The article considers whether this aim is achievable. It asks, in particular, whether accounts of epistemic democracy can be reconciled with the commonly held view that disagreement about which laws and policies should be enacted is a fundamental, permanent feature of democratic politics and imposes constraints on how we justify democratic procedures.