Economic theories of democratic legitimacy and the normative role of an ideal consensus. (May 2013)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: King, Christopher S.
• Is Part Of: Politics, philosophy & economics. Volume 12:Number 2(2013)
• Page Start: 156
• Page End: 178
• Publication Date: 2013-05
• Subjects: deliberative democracy -- democratic legitimacy -- economic theories of democracy -- ideal consensus; Social sciences and ethics -- Periodicals; Philosophy and social sciences -- Periodicals; 320.05
• DOI: 10.1177/1470594X12460636
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1470-594X

Abstract

Economic theories of democratic legitimacy (discussed here as minimalist theories) have criticized deliberative accounts of democratic legitimacy on the grounds that they do not represent a practical possibility and that they create conditions that make actual democracies worse. It is not simply that they represent the wrong ideal. Rather, they are too idealistic – failing to show proper regard for the cognitive and moral limitations of persons and the depth of disagreement in democratic society. This article aims to show (1) that the minimalist criterion of democratic legitimacy is self-defeating and (2) that even if there are minimal cognitive, moral, and social requirements for the possibility of practicable deliberative democracy, these limitations do not necessarily impose insuperable barriers for democratic deliberation as the normative basis of democratic legitimacy. Thus, the limiting facts do not dictate the structure of appropriate normative models of democracy in the way minimalists have supposed.