XII—The Weight of Truth: Lessons for Minimalists from Russell's Gray's Elegy Argument. Issue 3 (8th December 2014)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Button, Tim
• Is Part Of: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society for the Systematic Study of Philosophy. Volume 114:Issue 3:Part 3(2014)
• Page Start: 261
• Page End: 289
• Publication Date: 2014-12-08
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Periodicals; 100
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2014.00373.x
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0066-7374

Abstract

Abstract: Minimalists, such as Paul Horwich, claim that the notions of truth, reference and satisfaction are exhausted by some very simple schemes. Unfortunately, there are subtle difficulties with treating these as schemes, in the ordinary sense. So instead, minimalists regard them as illustrating one-place functions, into which we can input propositions (when considering truth) or propositional constituents (when considering reference and satisfaction). However, Bertrand Russell's Gray's Elegy argument teaches us some important lessons about propositions and propositional constituents. When applied to minimalism, these lessons show us why we should abandon it.