CEO inside debt holdings and credit ratings. Issue 1 (April 2023)
- Record Type:
- Journal Article
- Title:
- CEO inside debt holdings and credit ratings. Issue 1 (April 2023)
- Main Title:
- CEO inside debt holdings and credit ratings
- Authors:
- Hasan, Mostafa Monzur
Hossain, Ashrafee
Hossain, Takdir - Abstract:
- Highlights: We examine the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) inside debt holdings and credit ratings. Firms with a higher level of inside debt holdings enjoy better credit ratings. This relationship is more pronounced in firms with a poor information environment, a weak monitoring mechanism and powerful CEOs. Overall, credit rating agencies positively evaluate insider debt holdings in assessing the creditworthiness of a firm. Abstract: In this paper we investigate the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and long-term credit ratings. We provide evidence that firms with a higher level of inside debt holdings enjoy better credit ratings. Our results are robust to the use of alternative regression estimation and alternative measures of key variables. We employ instrumental variable–based two-stage least squares regression and instrumental variable regression estimation using heteroskedasticity-based instruments to mitigate the endogeneity concern. In addition, we employ propensity-matched sample and entropy balancing estimates to alleviate endogeneity concerns. Our cross-sectional analyses reveal that the relationship between CEO inside debt holdings and credit ratings is more pronounced in firms with a poor information environment, a weak monitoring mechanism, and powerful CEOs. Overall, findings from our study suggest that credit rating agencies evaluate CEO insider debt holdingsHighlights: We examine the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) inside debt holdings and credit ratings. Firms with a higher level of inside debt holdings enjoy better credit ratings. This relationship is more pronounced in firms with a poor information environment, a weak monitoring mechanism and powerful CEOs. Overall, credit rating agencies positively evaluate insider debt holdings in assessing the creditworthiness of a firm. Abstract: In this paper we investigate the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and long-term credit ratings. We provide evidence that firms with a higher level of inside debt holdings enjoy better credit ratings. Our results are robust to the use of alternative regression estimation and alternative measures of key variables. We employ instrumental variable–based two-stage least squares regression and instrumental variable regression estimation using heteroskedasticity-based instruments to mitigate the endogeneity concern. In addition, we employ propensity-matched sample and entropy balancing estimates to alleviate endogeneity concerns. Our cross-sectional analyses reveal that the relationship between CEO inside debt holdings and credit ratings is more pronounced in firms with a poor information environment, a weak monitoring mechanism, and powerful CEOs. Overall, findings from our study suggest that credit rating agencies evaluate CEO insider debt holdings positively in assessing the creditworthiness of a firm. … (more)
- Is Part Of:
- Journal of contemporary accounting & economics. Volume 19:Issue 1(2023)
- Journal:
- Journal of contemporary accounting & economics
- Issue:
- Volume 19:Issue 1(2023)
- Issue Display:
- Volume 19, Issue 1 (2023)
- Year:
- 2023
- Volume:
- 19
- Issue:
- 1
- Issue Sort Value:
- 2023-0019-0001-0000
- Page Start:
- Page End:
- Publication Date:
- 2023-04
- Subjects:
- M12 -- G24 -- G34
CEO inside debt -- Executive compensation -- Credit ratings
Accounting -- Periodicals
Accounting -- Research -- Periodicals
Accounting -- Periodicals
Accounting
Accounting -- Research
Periodicals
657.05 - Journal URLs:
- http://rave.ohiolink.edu/ejournals/issn/18155669/ ↗
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/18155669 ↗
http://www.sciencedirect.com/ ↗ - DOI:
- 10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100337 ↗
- Languages:
- English
- ISSNs:
- 1815-5669
- Deposit Type:
- Legaldeposit
- View Content:
- Available online (eLD content is only available in our Reading Rooms) ↗
- Physical Locations:
- British Library DSC - BLDSS-3PM
British Library HMNTS - ELD Digital store - Ingest File:
- 26313.xml