Lotze on Comparison and the Unity of Consciousness. Issue 5 (16th July 2022)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Textor, Mark
• Is Part Of: Canadian journal of philosophy. Volume 52:Issue 5(2022)
• Page Start: 556
• Page End: 572
• Publication Date: 2022-07-16
• Subjects: Hermann Lotze -- Immanuel Kant -- Johann Friedrich Herbart -- Franz Brentano -- comparison -- unity of consciousness -- composition; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1017/can.2022.48
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0045-5091

Abstract

Abstract: Hermann Lotze argued that the fact that consciousness simultaneously "holds objects together as well as apart" such that they can be compared implies (a) that there is a simple thinker and (b) that consciousness is an 'indivisible unity.' I offer a reconstruction and evaluation of Lotze's Argument from Comparison. I contend that it does not deliver (a) but makes a good case for (b). I will relate Lotze's argument to the contemporary debate between "top-down" and "bottom-up" views of the unity of consciousness and locate it in its historical context. (Kant and Herbart figure prominently here.)