Frege's Conception of Logic: Truth, the True, and Assertion. Issue 6 (1st September 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Kim, Junyeol
• Is Part Of: Theoria. Volume 87:Issue 6(2021)
• Page Start: 1397
• Page End: 1417
• Publication Date: 2021-09-01
• Subjects: Gottlob Frege -- truth -- logic -- judgement -- assertion -- knowledge; Philosophy -- Periodicals; Psychology -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1111/theo.12345
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0040-5825

Abstract

Abstract: Gottlob Frege takes logic to be the science of truth throughout his career. However, the mature Frege makes remarks which seem to go against the idea that logic is the science of truth. This paper shows that we can explain away this tension in the mature Frege's conception of logic if we accept that truth is an object, that is, the truth‐vale True qua the reference of a sentence, for Frege. Even though the main thesis of this paper is a conditional, I provide reasons why we ought to consider the possibility seriously that truth is an object for Frege. I also explain how we can make sense of Frege's conception of logic as the science of truth while accepting truth is an object.