Improving risk-equalization in Switzerland: Effects of alternative reform proposals on reallocating public subsidies for hospitals. Issue 12 (December 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Beck, Konstantin; Kauer, Lukas; McGuire, Thomas G.; Schmid, Christian P.R.
• Is Part Of: Health policy. Volume 124:Issue 12(2020)
• Page Start: 1363
• Page End: 1367
• Publication Date: 2020-12
• Subjects: Risk equalization -- Risk adjustment -- Risk sharing -- Payment fit; Medical education -- Periodicals; Medical policy -- Periodicals; Delivery of Health Care -- Periodicals; Education, Medical -- Periodicals; Health Education -- Periodicals; Health Planning -- Periodicals; Public Policy -- Periodicals; Enseignement médical -- Périodiques; Politique sanitaire -- Périodiques; Medical education; Medical policy; Periodicals; Electronic journals; Electronic journals; 362.1
• DOI: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2020.08.011
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0168-8510

Abstract

Highlights: Current reform proposals aim to reallocate public (cantonal) subsidies for hospitals. Alternative proposals have different incentive effects on efficiency and solidarity. The two currently discussed proposals reduce incentives for efficiency and solidarity. Transforming hospital subsidies into high-cost risk-sharing for all health care costs is superior. It reduces incentives for risk-selection and increases incentives for efficiency. Abstract: The Swiss healthcare financing system is on the verge of one of its largest reforms. The Swiss parliament is currently debating how to reallocate about 20 % of total health expenditures. Swiss cantons make substantial tax-funded contributions to health expenditures by paying 55 % of hospital inpatient costs. As health insurers are fully responsible for all outpatient costs, the present system may provide unintended incentives to treat patients in inpatient settings. This paper presents and evaluates three alternative reform proposals for the reallocation of the cantonal contribution. Two proposals are currently under consideration in the Swiss parliament, suggesting either partial cost-sharing (20 %) of all healthcare costs or inclusion of cantonal contributions into the risk-equalization fund. A third option is developed in this paper, which proposes using the cantonal funds to pay a share of insurer's expenses above a high-cost threshold. The high-cost risk-sharing alternative is clearly superior: it mitigates the incentive to discriminate against sicker individuals, improves incentives for cost control, and reduces risk of loss for insurers. The paper adds results from Switzerland to an international literature on the properties of adding high-cost risk sharing to a risk equalization model.