Arbitrariness Arguments against Temporal Discounting. Issue 3 (3rd July 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Smartt, Tim
• Is Part Of: Australasian philosophical review. Volume 5:Issue 3(2021)
• Page Start: 302
• Page End: 308
• Publication Date: 2021-07-03
• Subjects: decision theory -- rationality -- time bias -- temporal discounting -- Craig Callender; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 101
• DOI: 10.1080/24740500.2021.2112129
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2474-0500

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Craig Callender [2022] provides a novel challenge to the non-arbitrariness principle. His challenge plays an important role in his argument for the rational permissibility of a non-exponential temporal discounting rate. But the challenge is also of wider interest: it raises significant questions about whether we ought to accept the non-arbitrariness principle as a constraint on rational preferences. In this paper, I present two reasons to resist Callender's challenge. First, I present a reason to reject his claim that the non-arbitrariness principle only targets pure time preferences. Second, I criticize the inference Callender draws from a modest claim to a much stronger claim. The modest claim is that it can be hard to reveal the contents of an agent's preferences. The stronger claim is that this provides us with a reason to reject a certain kind of normative constraint on rational preferences. I argue that the modest claim doesn't motivate the stronger claim. The upshot of my two arguments is good news for those sympathetic to the non-arbitrariness principle: Callender's challenge can be overcome, at least as it currently stands.