Anomalous Monism and Mental Causation: A Husserlian Reflection. Issue 54 (2nd January 2023)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Liu, Chang
• Is Part Of: Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology. Issue 54:Number 1(2023)
• Page Start: 30
• Page End: 55
• Publication Date: 2023-01-02
• Subjects: Husserl -- mental causation -- anomalous monism -- explanatory pluralism; Phenomenology -- Periodicals; Fenomenologie; Filosofie; Phénoménologie -- Périodiques; Phenomenology; Periodicals; 142.7
• DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2022.2122728
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0007-1773

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Drawing on material from Husserlian phenomenology, we can reconstruct a realist version of anomalous monism (rAM). According to such a view, mental events are identical to some physical events because they simultaneously exemplify mental and physical properties. rAM would have to confront the charge of epiphenomenalism because Husserl rejects psychophysical causal interaction. And as a form of nonreductive physicalism, rAM also faces the challenge of Kim's supervenience argument and explanatory exclusion. Utilizing Husserl's conception of mental motivation and contemporary elaborations of substance causation, rAM can refute the accusation of epiphenomenalism and overcome the problem of exclusion.