Understanding Central Bank Independence. Issue 4 (2nd October 2022)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Marshall, Wesley C.; Rochon, Louis-Philippe
• Is Part Of: International journal of political economy. Volume 51:Issue 4(2022)
• Page Start: 346
• Page End: 373
• Publication Date: 2022-10-02
• Subjects: Central bank independence -- monetary standards -- Polanyian theory; E58 -- E42 -- B31; Political science -- Periodicals; Science politique -- Périodiques; Political science; Internationale betrekkingen; Economie; Periodicals; Electronic journals; 320
• DOI: 10.1080/08911916.2022.2137352
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0891-1916

Abstract

Abstract: This article asks a simple question that does not have a simple answer: whose interests do independent central banks serve? Employing a Polanyian lens, we explore the many facets of independent central banks, including their history, their institutional nature and functions, and the academic debate surrounding them, in order to reach several conclusions that can hopefully continue to expand the debate regarding the issue.