Committed to Reciprocate on a Bribe or Blow the Whistle: The Effects of Periodical Staff-Rotation in Public Administration. Issue 2 (4th March 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Fišar, Miloš; Krčál, Ondřej; Staněk, Rostislav; Špalek, Jiří
• Is Part Of: Public performance & management review. Volume 44:Issue 2(2021)
• Page Start: 404
• Page End: 424
• Publication Date: 2021-03-04
• Subjects: Anti-corruption practices -- bribery -- economic experiment -- staff rotation; Civil service -- Labor productivity -- Periodicals; Civil service -- Labor productivity -- United States -- Periodicals; Government productivity -- Periodicals; Government productivity -- United States -- Periodicals; Public administration -- Periodicals; Public administration -- United States -- Periodicals; Civil service -- Labor productivity; Government productivity; Public administration; United States; Periodicals; 351.05
• DOI: 10.1080/15309576.2020.1812410
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1530-9576

Abstract

Abstract: Periodic rotation of staff in public administration may lead to lower corruption, as it disrupts long-term relationships between public officials and potential bribers. We use an experimental design to test the anti-corruption effect of staff rotation in situations in which public officials have committed to reciprocating bribes. We find that staff rotation does not influence the proportion of firms offering bribes but reduces the share of bribe acceptance and inefficient decisions due to bribery. The outcome of the staff rotation treatment, in which firms offered bribes even though they were rarely accepted by officials, is consistent with the game having a quantal response equilibrium.