Campaign Contributions from Corporate Executives in Lieu of Political Action Committees. (14th August 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Richter, Brian Kelleher; Werner, Timothy
• Is Part Of: Journal of law, economics, & organization. Volume 33:Number 3(2017)
• Page Start: 443
• Page End: 474
• Publication Date: 2017-08-14
• Subjects: Law -- Periodicals; Economics -- Periodicals; Organization -- Periodicals; Jurisprudence -- Periodicals; 340.05
• DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewx009
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 8756-6222

Abstract

Abstract: Limiting corporate participation in electoral politics is a central focus of campaign finance reform. In this spirit, individual candidates for office have prohibited corporate-linked political action committees (PACs) from contributing to their campaigns. On the surface, such no-PAC policies might seem like an effective way to keep corporate-linked monies out of electoral politics; however, they ignore the reality that corporate monies have a variety of ways to find their way into candidates' campaign accounts. We leverage these candidate-specific refusals to accept PAC monies to uncover concomitant spikes in the pattern of corporate executives' personal campaign contributions that are most pronounced for executives at firms with active PACs which contributed to the candidates in question. These results come from a newly constructed dataset that includes all CEO–firm–candidate contribution pairs for active S&P500 firms over an 18-year period and suggests that CEOs strategically act in lieu of their firms' linked PACs. ( JEL D72, L51)