Research on False Data Injection Attack in Smart Grid. Issue 1 (March 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Xu, Aidong; Zhang, Tengyue; Chen, Liang; Li, Qing; Zhang, Yunan; Lin, Haojie; Wang, Peiyao; Wu, Sihui; Zhao, Runhui; Jiang, Yixin
• Is Part Of: IOP conference series. Volume 693:Issue 1(2021)
• Publication Date: 2021-03
• Subjects: Earth sciences -- Periodicals; Environmental sciences -- Congresses; Environmental sciences -- Periodicals; 550.5
• DOI: 10.1088/1755-1315/693/1/012010
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1755-1307

Abstract

Abstract: The concealed false data injection (FDI) attack in the smart grid can successfully pass the power system state estimation commonly used in the residual bad data test without being detected by the existing algorithms, resulting in the state estimation error of the control center and disturbing the normal operation of the power system. In this paper, false data injection attack and attack detection are carried out in the actual power edge security protection system, microgrid control system and intelligent energy security protection system. Among them, the false data attack part simulates the attack of the voltage phase angle, and compares it with the ordinary attack method, and demonstrates the success of these attacks in the actual power grid system.