The A Priori: Merleau-Ponty's 'New Definition'. Issue 4 (8th August 2022)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Shahid, Sidra
• Is Part Of: International journal of philosophical studies. Volume 30:Issue 4(2022)
• Page Start: 399
• Page End: 419
• Publication Date: 2022-08-08
• Subjects: Merleau-Ponty; a priori; a posteriori; transcendental idealism; transcendental phenomenology; Philosophy -- Periodicals; Philosophy -- History -- Periodicals; 100
• DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2108102
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0967-2559

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Despite the significant amount of debate that Merleau-Ponty's work has seen over the years, it remains an unresolved issue whether his phenomenology offers what he announces as a 'new definition of the a priori'. In this paper, I make a case in favor of his claim by clarifying his commitments to the a priori against two dominant lines of interpretation, naturalist and Kantian. I argue that Merleau-Ponty's view that the sciences themselves rely on the a priori method of Wesensschau establishes his basic commitment to apriority. At the same time, Merleau-Ponty's treatment of the a priori differs in important respects from the Kantian a priori and its transcendental idealist ramifications because, on his view, the subject is not the unique ground of constitution. Having tackled these obstacles to understanding Merleau-Ponty's commitments to the a priori, I argue in light of his conception of 'radical reflection' that rather than being a static element of experience, the a priori stands in a dynamic relation with the a posteriori as a distinctive way of articulating structures of lived experience.