Evolutionary game model of construction enterprises and construction material manufacturers in the construction and demolition waste resource utilization. Issue 2 (February 2023)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Shao, Zhiguo; Li, Mengdi; Han, Chuanfeng; Meng, Lingpeng
• Is Part Of: Waste management & research. Volume 41:Issue 2(2023)
• Page Start: 477
• Page End: 495
• Publication Date: 2023-02
• Subjects: Construction and demolition waste -- evolutionary game -- external environment -- numerical simulation; Factory and trade waste -- Periodicals; Refuse and refuse disposal -- Periodicals; Municipal engineering -- Periodicals; Déchets industriels -- Périodiques; Déchets -- Élimination -- Périodiques; Génie urbain -- Périodiques; 628
• DOI: 10.1177/0734242X221122548
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0734-242X

Abstract

With the continuous advancement of urbanization, a huge amount of construction and demolition waste (CDW) is generated in large-scaled construction activities, which has aggravated the problem of environmental pollution, waste of resources and destruction of city appearance. In the context of waste-free city, the recycling of CDW can reduce environmental pollution and promote the sustainable development of a city. However, only 20–30% of CDW in the world is recycled, showing a low rate of global CDW utilization. In order to improve the utilization rate, this paper selects construction enterprises and construction material manufacturers as main participants, applies evolutionary game theory to construct an evolutionary game model on the two parties' decision-making behaviors in CDW recycling, and uses MATLAB to make a numerical simulation. The aim of the model is to analyze the influence of various factors on the parties' decision-making behavior evolution and propose strategies to promote CDW utilization. The study found that the stable state of the CDW resource utilization system mainly depends on the difference between revenue and costs, the initial strategy, and the strength of the external environment; for the government, a supervision strategy is found to be necessary, and the best supervision level is 0.6. In the early stage of resource utilization of CDW, subsidies to construction material manufacturers should be increased to improve their initial participation; public participation can effectively improve the efficiency of government supervision, and its optimal participation level is greater than or equal to 0.4; under weak supervision, government penalty increases alone cannot prevent construction enterprises from illegally disposing of CDW. Therefore, the greater the difference, the positive the initial strategy, and the stronger the external environment, the more the behavior of the two participants tends to be {participation, use}. The results show that the government should establish effective supervision mechanisms and legal systems, improve supervision hotlines and information platforms, encourage the public to participate in CDW management and supervision, set appropriate rewards and punishments, strengthen supervision and management levels, reduce supervision costs, and ensure the effectiveness of construction management to improve the efficiency of cooperation between construction enterprises and construction material manufacturers.