The Case Against Higher-Order Metaphysics. (8th December 2022)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Hofweber, Thomas
• Is Part Of: Metaphysics. Volume 5:Number 1(2022)
• Page Start: 29
• Page End: 50
• Publication Date: 2022-12-08
• Subjects: higher-order metaphysics -- quantification -- that-clauses -- metaphysics -- Russell-Myhill -- structure -- formal tools; 110
• DOI: 10.5334/met.83
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2515-8279

Abstract

Although higher-order metaphysics seems prima facie to be a promising new approach to metaphysics, it is nonetheless based on a mistake. This mistake is tied to a misuse of formal languages in metaphysics in general, not just to the use of higher-order rather than lower-order languages. I hope to highlight the mistake by discussing a popular recent example of higher- order metaphysics: the argument that reality is not structured using reasoning inspired by the Russell-Myhill paradox. A key issue will be the relationship between higher-order quantification in formal languages and quantification in English, in particular the questions whether such quantifiers are already to be found in English, and whether they could simply be added to English if not in order to gain expressive strength. I will conclude that little of metaphysical significance follows from this Russell-Myhill inspired argument against structure. The reason why the results of higher-order logic show little of metaphysical significance generalizes to other uses of higher-order logic in metaphysical theorizing, and with it supports that higher-order metaphysics is a flawed research program. I end with some reflections on what positive role formal tools like higher-order logic can have in metaphysics, and what the fundamental mistake is on which higher-order metaphysics is based.