Pay-For-Delay Practices in the Pharmaceutical Sector: Lundbeck, Actavis, and Others. (January 2014)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Choi, William; Den Uyl, Bruce; Hughes, Mat
• Is Part Of: Journal of European competition law & practice. Volume 5:Number 1(2014)
• Page Start: 44
• Page End: 52
• Publication Date: 2014-01
• Subjects: Antitrust law -- European Union countries -- Periodicals; 343.072109405
• DOI: 10.1093/jeclap/lpt071
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2041-7764

Abstract

Abstract: It is straightforward to set out an economic model in which pay-for-delay settlements may lead to monopoly profit sharing, so as to prevent entry and to keep prices high; The U.S. Supreme Court's and the European Commission's guidance appears to differ in that regard, with the U.S. Supreme Court focusing primarily on the size of the payment and whether it has a legitimate justification; In some circumstances, banning pay-for-delay may reduce the scope for settlements to be agreed and, somewhat paradoxically, delay market entry by generics firms.