Partial report is the wrong paradigm. (19th September 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Stazicker, James
• Is Part Of: Philosophical transactions. Volume 373:Number 1755(2018)
• Publication Date: 2018-09-19
• Subjects: partial report -- consciousness -- cognitive access -- overflow -- NCC; Biology -- Periodicals; Science -- Periodicals; 570
• DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2017.0350
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0962-8436

Abstract

Abstract : Is consciousness independent of the general-purpose information processes known as 'cognitive access'? The dominant methodology for supporting this independence hypothesis appeals to partial report experiments as evidence for perceptual consciousness in the absence of cognitive access. Using a standard model of evidential support, and reviewing recent elaborations of the partial report paradigm, this article argues that the paradigm has the wrong structure to support the independence hypothesis. Like reports in general, a subject's partial report is evidence that she is conscious of information only where that information is cognitively accessed. So, partial report experiments could dissociate consciousness from cognitive access only if there were uncontroversial evidence for consciousness that did not imply reportability. There is no such evidence. An alternative, broadly Marrian methodology for supporting the independence hypothesis is suggested, and some challenges to it outlined. This methodology does not require experimental evidence for consciousness in the absence of cognitive access. Instead, it focuses on a function of perceptual consciousness when a stimulus is cognitively accessed. If the processes best suited to implement this function exclude cognitive access, the independence hypothesis will be supported. One relevant function of consciousness may be reflected in reason-based psychological explanations of a subject's behaviour. This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.