Auction design for capacity allocation in the petroleum pipeline under fair opening. (1st February 2023)
- Record Type:
- Journal Article
- Title:
- Auction design for capacity allocation in the petroleum pipeline under fair opening. (1st February 2023)
- Main Title:
- Auction design for capacity allocation in the petroleum pipeline under fair opening
- Authors:
- Liao, Qi
Tu, Renfu
Zhang, Wan
Wang, Bohong
Liang, Yongtu
Zhang, Haoran - Abstract:
- Abstract: Auction is a dominant way to allocate transport capacities for the aim of profit, fairness, and transparency. Previous related work focuses on the natural gas pipeline and cannot be applied to the petroleum pipeline for its special technique of transporting multiple batches. This paper designs a bi-level model for capacity auction of the petroleum pipeline, which facilitates fair competition and free flow of petroleum products in market. The upper-level model simulates the decision-making process of pipeline company, and the lower-level one determines if shippers bid up prices for capacities somewhere. A real-world pipeline is taken as a case to explore the impact of different auction designs and proration on capacity allocation. New shippers obtain all the nominations of 18, 700 m 3 by auction but lost the capacities of 3, 523 m 3 by proration. Compared to proration, auction leads to a profit growth of 181, 545 CNY and 150, 019 CNY to pipeline company and new shippers respectively but a decrease of 4, 586 CNY to regular shippers. Different orders of offering price lead to different outcomes regarding fairness and revenue. Letting new shippers offer price first is suggested as a base to design auction for capacity allocation since it generates a reduction of 0.2% to regular shippers but an increase of over 12% to others. Highlights: Bi-level model – company decision maker and shippers bidding level The law behind the capacity allocation results obtained fromAbstract: Auction is a dominant way to allocate transport capacities for the aim of profit, fairness, and transparency. Previous related work focuses on the natural gas pipeline and cannot be applied to the petroleum pipeline for its special technique of transporting multiple batches. This paper designs a bi-level model for capacity auction of the petroleum pipeline, which facilitates fair competition and free flow of petroleum products in market. The upper-level model simulates the decision-making process of pipeline company, and the lower-level one determines if shippers bid up prices for capacities somewhere. A real-world pipeline is taken as a case to explore the impact of different auction designs and proration on capacity allocation. New shippers obtain all the nominations of 18, 700 m 3 by auction but lost the capacities of 3, 523 m 3 by proration. Compared to proration, auction leads to a profit growth of 181, 545 CNY and 150, 019 CNY to pipeline company and new shippers respectively but a decrease of 4, 586 CNY to regular shippers. Different orders of offering price lead to different outcomes regarding fairness and revenue. Letting new shippers offer price first is suggested as a base to design auction for capacity allocation since it generates a reduction of 0.2% to regular shippers but an increase of over 12% to others. Highlights: Bi-level model – company decision maker and shippers bidding level The law behind the capacity allocation results obtained from auction and proration New shippers obtain all the nominations by auction but 18.8% lost by proration Let new shipper bid first- 14.8% and 12% profit growth for new shippers and carrier … (more)
- Is Part Of:
- Energy. Volume 264(2023)
- Journal:
- Energy
- Issue:
- Volume 264(2023)
- Issue Display:
- Volume 264, Issue 2023 (2023)
- Year:
- 2023
- Volume:
- 264
- Issue:
- 2023
- Issue Sort Value:
- 2023-0264-2023-0000
- Page Start:
- Page End:
- Publication Date:
- 2023-02-01
- Subjects:
- Capacity allocation -- Auction design -- Petroleum pipeline -- Bi-level model
Power resources -- Periodicals
Power (Mechanics) -- Periodicals
Energy consumption -- Periodicals
333.7905 - Journal URLs:
- http://www.elsevier.com/journals ↗
- DOI:
- 10.1016/j.energy.2022.126079 ↗
- Languages:
- English
- ISSNs:
- 0360-5442
- Deposit Type:
- Legaldeposit
- View Content:
- Available online (eLD content is only available in our Reading Rooms) ↗
- Physical Locations:
- British Library DSC - 3747.445000
British Library DSC - BLDSS-3PM
British Library HMNTS - ELD Digital store - Ingest File:
- 25027.xml