Counterfactual cognition and psychosis: adding complexity to predictive processing accounts. (17th February 2023)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Rappe, Sofiia; Wilkinson, Sam
• Is Part Of: Philosophical psychology. Volume 36:Number 2(2023)
• Page Start: 356
• Page End: 379
• Publication Date: 2023-02-17
• Subjects: Psychosis -- counterfactuals -- delusions -- hallucinations -- predictive processing -- reality monitoring; Psychology -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; Philosophy -- Periodicals; Psychology -- Methodology -- Periodicals; 150.1
• DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2022.2054789
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0951-5089

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Over the last decade or so, several researchers have considered the predictive processing framework (PPF) to be a useful perspective from which to shed some much-needed light on the mechanisms behind psychosis. Most approaches to psychosis within PPF come down to the idea of the "atypical" brain generating inaccurate hypotheses that the "typical" brain does not generate, either due to a systematic top-down processing bias or more general precision weighting breakdown. Strong at explaining common individual symptoms of psychosis, such approaches face some issues when we look at a more general clinical picture. In this paper, we propose an update on the current accounts of psychosis based on the realization that a neurotypical brain constantly generates non-actual, de-coupled, counterfactual hypotheses as part of healthy cognition. We suggest that what is going on in psychosis, at least in some cases, is not so much a generation of erroneous hypotheses, but rather an inability to correctly use the counterfactual ones. This updated view casts "accurate" cognition as more fragile and delicate, but also closes the gap between psychosis and typical cognition.