Corruption Breeds Corruption. (June 2014)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Ghatak, Anirban; Iyengar, Sudarshan
• Other Names: Mukherjee Diganta guest-editor.; Sarangi Sudipta guest-editor.
• Is Part Of: Studies in microeconomics. Volume 2:Number 1(2014)
• Page Start: 121
• Page End: 132
• Publication Date: 2014-06
• Subjects: Corruption -- evolutionary game -- bribery -- reputation; Microeconomics -- Periodicals; 338.505
• DOI: 10.1177/2321022214522730
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2321-0222

Abstract

We study extortion bribe or harassment bribe as a mode of corruption in this article. Corruption is modelled as a network game in the study. We take reputation into account in this model, and assume that reputation has a direct effect on the pay-offs of the agents in this game. We find the necessary conditions to make corruption as an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy against Multiple Mutations (ESSMM) in a game where players have both corruption and honesty as their strategies. ESSMM posits itself as a better tool than Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) to analyze such a situation where a society strives to eradicate traits like corruption completely. We claim that in a market norm (Ariely, 2013) oriented society, corruption breeds corruption and infects the whole society through robust asexual reproduction.