Do Constancy Mechanisms Save Distal Content?. (25th January 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Garson, Justin
• Is Part Of: Philosophical quarterly. Volume 69:Number 275(2019:Apr.)
• Page Start: 409
• Page End: 417
• Publication Date: 2019-01-25
• Subjects: teleosemantics -- content indeterminacy -- distal content -- biological function -- constancy mechanisms; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqy032
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0031-8094

Abstract

Abstract: In this journal, Schulte develops a novel solution to the problem of distal content: by virtue of what is a mental representation about a distal object (say, a snake) rather than a more proximal cause of that representation (say, a snake-shaped retinal impression)? Schulte maintains that in order for a (sensory-perceptual) representation to have a distal content, it must be produced by a constancy mechanism, along with two other conditions. I raise three objections to his solution. First, a core component of Schulte's solution is just a restrictive version of Dretske's solution, but Schulte gives no argument for his restriction. Second, his proposed solution to a disjunction problem (his 'naturalness' condition) is ad hoc. Finally, his 'far-out' version of the distality problem is not a version of the distality problem at all. I conclude that Dretske's solution is preferable to Schulte's.