Fast-response and low-tolerance promotes cooperation in cascading system collapse. (January 2023)
- Record Type:
- Journal Article
- Title:
- Fast-response and low-tolerance promotes cooperation in cascading system collapse. (January 2023)
- Main Title:
- Fast-response and low-tolerance promotes cooperation in cascading system collapse
- Authors:
- Tan, Huaiyu
He, Zhixue
Du, Chunpeng
Shi, Lei - Abstract:
- Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the impact of cascading exit on the evolution of cooperation in structured populations. Specifically, we introduce "rational choice" and "community of interest" in evolutionary games to define the exit rules. Exit behavior is determined by (i) an edge tolerance threshold when being exploited and (ii) the triangle exit rule that a focal player interrupts the interaction with its neighbor's opponent which belongs to the joint neighborhood set. Results from Monte Carlo simulation show that the edge-based exit can promote the short-term cooperation, but it ultimately goes to extinction. At the same time, this process also triggers the effect of the second-order exit rule, which destroys the network topology completely. The fast-response and low-tolerance not only slows down the decomposition of network structures, but also delays the extinction of cooperation. Moreover, we find that the termination time of the network evolution exhibits an exponential distribution while the proportion of the remaining nodes exhibits a decreasing non-linear relationship. Our results shed some new lights on the coupling effects of the evolution of cooperation in the structured population with the network cascading process. Highlights: The edge-based exit mechanism can promote short-term cooperation in the cascade exit process. Fast-response and low-tolerance slow the collapse of network and delay the extinction of cooperation. The termination time ofAbstract: In this paper, we investigate the impact of cascading exit on the evolution of cooperation in structured populations. Specifically, we introduce "rational choice" and "community of interest" in evolutionary games to define the exit rules. Exit behavior is determined by (i) an edge tolerance threshold when being exploited and (ii) the triangle exit rule that a focal player interrupts the interaction with its neighbor's opponent which belongs to the joint neighborhood set. Results from Monte Carlo simulation show that the edge-based exit can promote the short-term cooperation, but it ultimately goes to extinction. At the same time, this process also triggers the effect of the second-order exit rule, which destroys the network topology completely. The fast-response and low-tolerance not only slows down the decomposition of network structures, but also delays the extinction of cooperation. Moreover, we find that the termination time of the network evolution exhibits an exponential distribution while the proportion of the remaining nodes exhibits a decreasing non-linear relationship. Our results shed some new lights on the coupling effects of the evolution of cooperation in the structured population with the network cascading process. Highlights: The edge-based exit mechanism can promote short-term cooperation in the cascade exit process. Fast-response and low-tolerance slow the collapse of network and delay the extinction of cooperation. The termination time of evolution exhibits an exponential distribution in cascading process. … (more)
- Is Part Of:
- Chaos, solitons and fractals. Volume 166(2023)
- Journal:
- Chaos, solitons and fractals
- Issue:
- Volume 166(2023)
- Issue Display:
- Volume 166, Issue 2023 (2023)
- Year:
- 2023
- Volume:
- 166
- Issue:
- 2023
- Issue Sort Value:
- 2023-0166-2023-0000
- Page Start:
- Page End:
- Publication Date:
- 2023-01
- Subjects:
- Evolutionary game -- Cooperation -- Exit mechanism -- Network cascading failure -- Edge-based strategy
Chaotic behavior in systems -- Periodicals
Solitons -- Periodicals
Fractals -- Periodicals
Chaotic behavior in systems
Fractals
Solitons
Periodicals
003.7 - Journal URLs:
- http://www.elsevier.com/journals ↗
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/09600779 ↗ - DOI:
- 10.1016/j.chaos.2022.112916 ↗
- Languages:
- English
- ISSNs:
- 0960-0779
- Deposit Type:
- Legaldeposit
- View Content:
- Available online (eLD content is only available in our Reading Rooms) ↗
- Physical Locations:
- British Library DSC - 3129.716000
British Library DSC - BLDSS-3PM
British Library HMNTS - ELD Digital store - Ingest File:
- 24770.xml