Analysis of the Construction of an Enterprise Emergency Management System under Government Supervision: The View of Evolutionary Game Theory. (3rd December 2022)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Wang, Yumeng; Zhou, Xihua; Bai, Gang; Li, Xianlin
• Other Names: Pamučar Dragan Academic Editor.
• Is Part Of: Mathematical problems in engineering. Volume 2022(2022)
• Publication Date: 2022-12-03
• Subjects: Engineering mathematics -- Periodicals; 510.2462
• DOI: 10.1155/2022/4781158
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1024-123X

Abstract

Abstract : The establishment of an emergency management system has obvious complexity, and the establishment of an enterprise's emergency management system is influenced by external factors such as assessment agencies and regulatory departments as well as by the internal influence of various factors within the enterprise itself, such as profits and personnel quality. In order to study the impact of different factors on the construction of emergency management systems of enterprises under the current regulatory environment and under the existing reward-penalty mechanism, this study introduces factors such as rent-seeking behavior and economic level to build an evolutionary game model composed of enterprises, third-party safety assessment agencies, and government regulators. Based on the official statistics published in China and the field evidence of enterprises, third-party agencies, and emergency management departments in Nanjing, Jiangsu Province, China. The evolution path of the game system and the influence of the reward-penalty mechanism, rent-seeking behavior, and economic level on the strategy evolution process of the game model were analyzed by numerical simulation. The results show that there is a mechanism of mutual promotion in the strategy evolution of the game subjects, and the strategy choice of each subject shows the following characteristics: (1) reasonable subsidies and penalties play a positive role in promoting the construction of emergency management systems by enterprises. (2) Increasing the rent-seeking costs of enterprises and the reputational impact of regulators can promote the positive evolution of enterprises' and regulators' strategies. (3) Reducing the cost of the establishment can help enterprises establish emergency management systems, but it will reduce the probability of strict supervision by the regulators. Therefore, the government should develop a reasonable reward-penalty mechanism to replace fixed payments to enterprises and third-party agencies with tax reductions. In addition, local governments should establish an information and consultation mechanism and make the system construction and evaluation process public.