A Critique and Refinement of the Wakefieldian Concept of Disorder: An Improvement of the Harmful Dysfunction Analysis. Issue 4 (5th November 2022)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Smith, Emmanuel
• Is Part Of: Journal of medicine and philosophy. Volume 47:Issue 4(2022)
• Page Start: 530
• Page End: 539
• Publication Date: 2022-11-05
• Subjects: diagnosis -- disorder -- normal/abnormal -- suffering; Medicine -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; Medical ethics -- Periodicals; Ethics, Medical -- Periodicals; Philosophy, Medical -- Periodicals; 616.001
• DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhac012
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0360-5310

Abstract

Abstract: One way in which bioethicists can benefit the medical community is by clarifying the concept of disorder. Since insurance companies refer to the DSM for whether a patient should receive assistance, one must consider the consequences of one's concept of disorder for who should be provided with care. I offer a refinement of Jerome Wakefield's hybrid concept of disorder, the harmful dysfunction analysis. I criticize both the factual component and the value component of Wakefield's account and suggest how they might be improved. I propose that the factual component should be statistical variation analyzed in multilevel and chronological compilations of physiological data. I propose that the value component should prioritize the individual's authority regarding the experience of suffering from a physiological condition. My account preserves the insight of using a factual and a value component while avoiding the problems that Wakefield's original account faces.