Aristotle's Alternative to Enduring and Perduring: Lasting. Issue 2 (September 2022)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Pemberton, John M.
• Is Part Of: Ancient philosophy today. Volume 4:Issue 2(2022)
• Page Start: 217
• Page End: 236
• Publication Date: 2022-09
• Subjects: Aristotle -- Persisting -- Enduring -- Perduring -- Temporal part -- Mereology; Philosophy, Ancient -- Periodicals; Philosophy, Modern -- Periodicals; Knowledge, Theory of -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.3366/anph.2022.0069
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2516-1156

Abstract

Abstract : Although Aristotle does not explicitly address persistence, his account of persisting may be derived from a careful consideration of his account of change. On my interpretation, he supposes that motions are mereological unities of their potential temporal parts – I dub such mereological unities 'lasting'. Aristotle's persisting things, too, are lasting, I argue. Lasting things are unlike enduring things in that they have temporal parts; and unlike perduring things in that their temporal parts are not actual, but rather are potential. Lasting, that is Aristotle's persisting, is thus a distinctive alternative to enduring and perduring. I assess this alternative showing it to be attractive.