Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons. (July 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Bianchin, Matteo
• Other Names: Zamora-Bonilla Jesús guest-editor.; Bouvier Alban guest-editor.; Kaldis Byron guest-editor.; Montuschi Eleonora guest-editor.; Zahle Julie guest-editor.
• Is Part Of: Philosophy of the social sciences. Volume 45:Number 4/5(2015:Jul./Sep.)
• Page Start: 442
• Page End: 461
• Publication Date: 2015-07
• Subjects: collective intentionality -- joint action -- mindreading -- plural subjects -- social ontology; Social sciences -- Periodicals; Social sciences -- Methodology -- Periodicals; Sciences sociales -- Périodiques; Sciences sociales -- Méthodologie -- Périodiques; 300.1
• DOI: 10.1177/0048393115580267
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0048-3931

Abstract

In this article, I argue that a capacity for mindreading conceived along the line of simulation theory provides the cognitive basis for forming we-centric representations of actions and goals. This explains the plural first personal stance displayed by we-intentions in terms of the underlying cognitive processes performed by individual minds, while preserving the idea that they cannot be analyzed in terms of individual intentional states. The implication for social ontology is that this makes sense of the plural subjectivity of joint actions without making group agents require either a corporate body or the unity of consciousness.