The Information Environment and Blameworthy Beliefs. (2nd November 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Millar, Boyd
• Is Part Of: Social epistemology. Volume 33:Number 6(2019)
• Page Start: 525
• Page End: 537
• Publication Date: 2019-11-02
• Subjects: Ethics of belief -- social media -- epistemic obligations -- doxastic blame -- excuses; Social epistemology -- Periodicals; 121
• DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2019.1676840
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0269-1728

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Thanks to the advent of social media, large numbers of Americans believe outlandish falsehoods that have been widely debunked. Many of us have a tendency to fault the individuals who hold such beliefs. We naturally assume that the individuals who form and maintain such beliefs do so in virtue of having violated some epistemic obligation: perhaps they failed to scrutinize their sources, or failed to seek out the available competing evidence. I maintain that very many ordinary individuals who acquire outlandish false beliefs thanks to their use of popular social media platforms (and other similar internet technologies) deserve little or no blame for believing these falsehoods. Such individuals would be fully blameworthy only if they had formed or maintained the relevant beliefs partly in virtue of violating some epistemic obligation and had no excuse for violating that obligation. However, the nature of these internet technologies provides excuses for violating the relevant epistemic obligations, and so individuals are excused for holding the resulting false beliefs.