What Facts Should be Treated as 'Fixed' in Public Justification?. (2nd November 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Reid, Andrew
• Is Part Of: Social epistemology. Volume 33:Number 6(2019)
• Page Start: 491
• Page End: 502
• Publication Date: 2019-11-02
• Subjects: Normative theory -- public reason -- testimony -- expertise -- facts in politics; Social epistemology -- Periodicals; 121
• DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2019.1637965
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0269-1728

Abstract

ABSTRACT: In his account of public reason Rawls assumes that some facts ought to be treated as 'fixed', or beyond reasonable disagreement. These include, for him, facts upon which there is a scientific consensus. Some fixed facts might not be accessible to all citizens in the sense that to verify them requires specialist or local knowledge that is unattainable; this is the case with many facts upon which there is a consensus amongst scientists or experts but not laypeople. In such circumstances it appears problematic to claim that those who dispute these facts are unreasonable. This paper sets out a partial resolution to this problem: that laypeople can still reach a reasonable consensus on factual claims that are based on expert knowledge through an assessment of the debate between experts and the way that knowledge is produced. However, this can only be done on a case-by-case basis, and applies more narrowly than Rawls' suggestion of deference to the scientific consensus. Whether a fact can be treated as fixed by these standards will depend on all citizens being able to obtain enough relevant information given a reasonable effort on their part.