An Argument from Normativity for Primitive Emotional Phenomenology. (4th May 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Álvarez-González, Aarón
• Is Part Of: Philosophical papers. Volume 50:Number 1/2(2021)
• Page Start: 31
• Page End: 52
• Publication Date: 2021-05-04
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Philosophy, African -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2021.1961602
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0556-8641

Abstract

Abstract: Uriah Kriegel has attempted to describe the varieties of consciousness, that is, the primitive elements that constitute the phenomenal realm. Perceptual, imaginative, algedonic, cognitive, entertaining, and conative are the types of phenomenology acknowledged by him. This list, though right, is incomplete. My main claim is that for it to be complete it should include sui generis emotional phenomenology. To motivate that thesis, I will highlight the characteristic normativity of emotional phenomenology and contrast it with the characteristic normativity of Kriegel's phenomenal elements. I will conceive, by means of a mental experiment in the form of a phenomenal contrast, a felt normative clash between emotional phenomenology and Kriegel's primitive phenomenal states. The idea behind it is that the felt normative clash is possible because emotional phenomenology and Kriegel's phenomenal elements are metaphysically distinct.