The conceptualization of emotions across cultures: a model based on interoceptive neuroscience. (June 2021)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Zhou, Pin; Critchley, Hugo; Garfinkel, Sarah; Gao, Ya
• Is Part Of: Neuroscience and biobehavioral reviews. Volume 125(2021)
• Page Start: 314
• Page End: 327
• Publication Date: 2021-06
• Subjects: Emotion -- Conceptualization -- Cross-cultural study -- Embodied semantics -- Interoceptive neuroscience -- Health psychology; Psychophysiology -- Periodicals; Human behavior -- Periodicals; Animal behavior -- Periodicals; Neurology -- Periodicals; Behavior -- Periodicals; Ethology -- Periodicals; Neurology -- Periodicals; Psychophysiologie -- Périodiques; Comportement humain -- Périodiques; Animaux -- Mœurs et comportement -- Périodiques; Neurologie -- Périodiques; Animal behavior; Human behavior; Neurology; Psychophysiology; Periodicals; Electronic journals; 573.8
• DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.02.023
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0149-7634

Abstract

Highlights: It proposes the notion of third generation of cognitivism that mental processes are neither an abstract, amodal, disembodied, symbolic representation of the world, nor a direct, instantaneous, and solely brain-based representation of reality. Instead, mind, with the mediation of exterocpetion and interoception, is both embodied and emotion-engaged. The concept of embodiment is redefined and expanded from exclusively exteroception-based to the inclusion of interoception. The somatization of emotions is re-examined and readdressed in the fields of cognitive semantics and health psychology. It proposes that two inversely related variables, bodily transparency and cognitive granularity, determine cultural differences in emotion concepts. A novel and comprehensive model based on interoceptive neuroscience is proposed seeking to capture the dynamic multidimensional interaction between body, mind, brain, language, and culture. Abstract: Mental processes are recognized to be embodied, hence dependent upon functions of the body. Interoception (i.e., the sense of the internal bodily physiology) underpinning motivational states and emotional feelings, however, are mostly ignored within present sensory-motor accounts of embodiment. The inclusion of interoception within models of embodiment is important both for health psychology and for theories of cognition. Here, we deduce that reference to visceral organs, in language describing emotion concepts, should be viewed as metonymy (i.e., the mental mapping wherein a component is used to describe the whole), rather than metaphor (i.e., one familiar and concrete concept used to describe another unfamiliar and/or abstract concept that shares some similarities). This view contrasts with a dominant assumption within cognitive linguistics. We further argue that conceptual differences in the assumption about the body-mind-emotion relationship or emotional somatization, evident when comparing Chinese to standard English, is culturally and cognitively determined (e.g., by divergent Western and Chinese philosophical, medical traditions and meaning systems). We propose a new model in which two contending variables, bodily transparency and cognitive granularity, define cultural differences in emotion conceptualization, capturing the dynamic multidimensional interaction between body, mind, brain, language, and society.