A visualization method for bidding games in the electricity spot market. (July 2022)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Pan, Zhanhua; Song, Yuhui; Jing, Zhaoxia
• Is Part Of: Energy reports. Volume 8(2022)Supplement 4
• Page Start: 1305
• Page End: 1312
• Publication Date: 2022-07
• Subjects: Visualization methods -- Game theory -- Power spot market bidding -- MPEC -- EPEC; Power resources -- Periodicals; Energy industries -- Periodicals; Power resources; Periodicals; Electronic journals; 621.04205
• DOI: 10.1016/j.egyr.2022.02.070
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2352-4847

Abstract

Abstract: Under the electricity market, generation companies (GenCos) maximize their own revenue through strategic bidding, and the Nash equilibrium (NE) formed by the game between GenCos is an effective tool to assist in the design and regulation of the electricity market. However, the power market bidding game is usually modeled as a nonlinear nonconvex complex model, and it is difficult for researchers to intuitively analyze the game process and discover the laws. In order to solve the above problems, this paper proposes a visualization method for the GenCos optimal offer model, based on which a visualization method for the GenCos bidding game process is proposed. The case study shows that the visualization-based analysis method can help researchers to visually infer the game evolution process, analyze the pattern of NE and evaluate the game results, and ultimately provide a reference for further market analysis.