Cooperative sales promotion with a point-sharing policy: Advantages and limitations. (July 2020)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Moon, Ilkyeong; Xu, Jie; Feng, Xuehao; Ruan, Xiao
• Is Part Of: Omega. Volume 94(2020)
• Publication Date: 2020-07
• Subjects: Point sharing -- Cost spillover -- Coordination -- Target rebate contract; Management -- Periodicals; 658.4005
• DOI: 10.1016/j.omega.2019.02.007
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0305-0483

Abstract

Highlights: We study a channel with two retailers under a point-sharing policy. We show that a pure policy-sharing policy may fail to maximize the channel profit. Cost performance and point-switching ratio affect the channel profit under the policy. A target rebate contract with the policy is proposed to coordinate the channel. Abstract: Consumption-point programs have been commonly implemented in retail industries in efforts to promote sales and improve customer loyalty. In Korea, many retailers from different industries use a point-sharing policy to augment the conventional consumption-point program of each retailer. In a multi-retailer coalition under such a cooperative sales promotion policy, by purchasing from one coalition retailer, customers earn points that they can redeem points at other retailers in the coalition. On one hand, the introduction of this policy gives customers great flexibility for redeeming earned points, which can increase the demand at all retailers who promote the policy. On the other hand, the additional product costs associated with the points created by one retailer may spill over and be partly borne by other retailers, possibly distorting the coalition members' equilibrium decisions under decentralized control. Under the general assumptions about the demand functions, we developed a model consisting of two retailers with fixed retail prices and addressed the retailers' equilibrium decisions under a pure point-sharing policy. The findings suggest that the policy resulted in a cost spillover phenomenon. Then, we revealed that a pure point-sharing policy may fail to maximize the total profit of the coalition. Moreover, we showed that a pure point-sharing policy does not dominate the individual point scheme, which may explain the reason that point sharing is useful but not ubiquitously used in the real world. Our numerical examples also illustrate the way a pure point-sharing policy influences retailers' profits when retail prices are decision variables. To improve the overall profit under the point-sharing policy further, we propose a target rebate contract to coordinate a pair of retailers. This contract can maximize the total profit and arbitrarily split the profit between retailers.